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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
TALLIE LEE CAVANESS, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs-
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
ON APPEAL 
S. TONY COX, Director, 
Drivers License Division, 
Department of Public Safety, 
State of Utah, 
Defendant and Respondent. ) 
* * * * * * * * * * * 
Case No. 15801 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a trial de nova hearing in Third 
District Court from a finding of the Utah Department of Public 
Safety, Driver's License Division Hearing that the Appellant 
refused to submit to a chemical test under Utah's implied consent 
statute. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Jay Banks of the Third District Court found that 
the requirements of Utah's implied consent law had been met, and 
that the Appellant had wrongfully refused a chemical test pursuant 
thereto and revoked Appelant's Driver's License for one year. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent requests this court to affirm the Trial 
Court's decision and to declare Subsection (g) of Utah Code 
Annotated, 41-6-44.10 (1953) as amended, to be constitutional, 
if, and to what extent, this court considers that issue. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent would make this court aware of essential 
dispositive facts that were not emphasized by the Appellant. 
The chronology of the events in the transcript is that 
rather than being stopped for a 'l:ninor- driving offense," he was 
stopped for exhibition driving and there was apparently some 
argument as to that. Besides the odor of alcohol, slurred 
speech, hand coordination problems and the admission of 
drinking, the appellant refused the field sobriety tests. (R·j 
Subsequently, the officer found a half open mini bottle in 
Respondent's coat pocket. (R-94). The arresting officer was 
also threatened with a false imprisonment suite, (R-99), before 
the breathalyzer test was requested and in the presence of a 
back-up officer (R-94), who had arrived approximately 10 
minutes later or at least after the officer waited 10 minutes 
for a wants and warrants check. During this time, Mr. cavanesi 
got out of the car three times while he was under arrest, (R-~f 
which testimony was substantiated by the officer, the back~up 
-2-
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officer (R-87), and also by the Respondent. (R-120). The 
Respondent on subsequent testimony denied that he ever got out 
of the car. (R-124). Although the Petitioner testified to 
the contrary, the arresting officer testified that he requested 
an attorney only 45 minutes later at the jail. (R-101). 
The back-up officer substantiated the arresting officer's 
testimony that the first refusal was "in the negative," (R-84), 
and that the implied consent statute was read and a similar 
request made (R-85). The arresting officer's testimony was that 
"he said no he wouldn't take the breathalyzer," (R-95), but that 
he did request to have an attorney present at the jail which was 
admitted and substantiated by the testimony of the Plaintiff when 
he admitted under oath that he had refused and wouldn't take the 
test "unless his attorney was present." (R-117). This was 
subsequent, and at the jail and the officer explained that 'he 
could call his attorney after he had taken the breathalyzer test." 
(R-101). The consequences of his refusal were explained to him, 
(R-96, 97), and he was allowed to read the implied consent card 
himself, (R-84, 85), which testimony was corroborated by the 
Plaintiff himself when he admitted that we was allowed to read 
the implied consent card and law, (R~ll8), which had previously 
been read to him. (R-97). 
The Respondent testified that he was in his last 
semester of law school at the time, (R-116, 96), and had taken 
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criminal law, (R-117), had "an exact knowledge of the law," 
(R-124), and had gone into the implied consent law in those 
classes. (R-119). 
He also admitted under oath that the real reason he 
refused was that he was angry at the officers, (R-123), and 
he felt that his rights had been violated. (R-125). 
POINT I 
THE UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT STATUTE IS CIVIL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
The Utah implied consent law, Utah Code Annotated 
41-6-44.10, (1953) as amended, is obviously a civil statute 
as declared by other courts with respect to similar statutes 
as the only remedy provided for there is a public safety 
remedy or the revocation of a "license or permit to drive." 
There are no other remedies provided under that act. The Utah 
Operator and Chauffeurs License Act, Utah Code Annotated 
41-2-1 (o), defines the word license as a privilege to aper~ 
a motor vehicle over the highways of this state. A license 
certificate is also defined as evidence of "the privilege" 
The purpose of that act is obviously for the safety of the 
traveling public and to identify individuals who have "a disre; 
for the safety of other persons on the highways." See Utah 
Code Annotated 41-2-19 (6). 
The United State Supreme Court in the case of ~ 
41 U.S. 105, 1977, on May 16, 1977, in holding that the 
-4-
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Illinois statute allowing the suspension of a driving privilege 
without a preliminary hearing was adequate under the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion, also stated that the nature of the private interest was 
not so great as to require a departure from "the ordinary 
principle . . that something less than an evidentiary hearing 
is sufficient prior to adverse administrative action," and cited 
the case of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319. This case 
involved a commercially licensed truck driver, and the court 
stated that the risks of a depravation of an individual's rights 
as opposed to the paramount public interest, did not deny the 
Appellant due process. Esentially that is the argument of this 
Appellant, i.e. that his right to due process was denied as he 
was denied the right to counsel. 
This has been the holding of all of the courts that have 
ruled on this question. For example, the court in Fritts v. The 
Department of Motor Vehicles, 6 Wash. App. 233, 492 P.2d 558, 1971, 
stated that, "regardless of whether driving is a right or a 
privilege, the license revocation proceeding is not a criminal 
proceeding" "the fact that in the criminal proceeding that 
the driver was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt to have been 
driving while intoxicated has no bearing on civil proceedings 
under 'cite omited' to revoke his drivers license for refusal to 
submit to a chemical test of his breath. We find other jurisdic-
tions in accord." The cases all explain that implied consent 
-5-
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proceedings are not criminal because there are no criminal 
penalties or dangers and because the public safety dangers 
out weigh the dangers to the loss of an individual's rights. 
They unanimously hold that criminal safeguards are not 
applicable to driving privilege revocation proceedings und~ 
implied consent laws because they have a subsequent right to 
hearing and a trial de novo along with the right to cross 
examine the individuals taking the test and the basis for 
the test scientifically and also, as in the case of the Utah 
implied consent statute, a right to have their own scentific 
test taken contemporaneously with the. test requested by the 
officer. See Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 .10 (f) as amended. 
Many of these cases are cited subsequently and we have found 
such holdings in the states of Arizona, Washington, California 
Colorado, Iowa, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Carolina, Ohio, Ore 
South Dakota, Hawaii, North Dakota along with. it being impliei 
by this Court in the State of Utah. Wherein all of these cas: 
simply say, what the statute does , that is that the only 
remedy provided is a revocation civil driving privilege. 
POINT II 
A DRIVER UNDER THE UTAH IMPLIED CONSENT LAW HAS 
NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH AN ATTORNEY 
OR TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY PRESENT BEFORE DECIDING TO 
SUBMIT OR NOT 
-6-
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Many courts have considered the question of whether or 
not a driver asked to take a chemical test under implied consent 
laws has a constitutional right to consult with counsel or to have 
counsel present before saying yes or no to the test. The 
consensus with respect to implied consent proceedings, among 
state supreme courts, is that such a constitutional right does 
not exist under either the United States Constitution or state 
constitutions. Agnew v. Hjelle, 216 N.W. 2d 291 (N.D. 1974); Blow 
v. Commissioner, 83 S.D. 628, 164 N.W. 2d 351 (1969); Campbell 
v. Superior Court, 106 Ariz. 542, 479 P. 2d 685 (1971); Coleman 
v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 684, 187 N.E. 2d 172 (1972); Common-
wealth, Department of Transportation v. Cannon, 4 Pa. cmwlth. 119, 
286 A. 2d 24 (1972); Calvert v. State, 519 P. 2d 341 (Colo. 1974); 
Harrison v. State, Department of Public Safety, 298 So. 2d 312 
(La. App. 1974); Mills v. Bridges, 93 Id. 679, 471 P. 2d 66 (1970); 
Robertson v. State, 501 P. 2d 1099 (Okla. 1972); Siegwald v. 
Curry, 319 N.E. 2d 381 (Ohio 1974); Spradling v. Deimeke, 528 S.W. 
2d 759 (Mo. 1975); State v. Dellveneri, 258 A. 2d 834 (Vt. 1969); 
State v. Kenderski, 99 N.J. Super. 224, 239 A. 2d 249 (1969); 
State v. Petkus, 269 A. 2d 123 (N.H. 1970); State v. Severino, 
537 P. 2d 1187 (Haw. 1975); State v. Stevens, 252 A. 2d 58 
(Me. 1969); State v. Trotter, 4 Conn. Cir. 185, 230 A. 2d 618 
(1967); Stratikos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 4. Or. App. 
313, 477 P. 2d 237 (1970); Swenumson v. Iowa Department of 
Public Safety, 210 N.W. 2d 660 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 
-7-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
190 Neb. 724, 211 N.W. 2d 906 (1973); Westmoreland v. Chapm 
--:...::....:..::..::.-=..:::.=..::::.-.::..:__~_::p an, 
Ct. App., 74 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1968). 
The foregoing cases represent 21 different jurisdictlc 
and are mostly state supreme court decisions. Two United 
States Supreme Court cases, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 
757 (1966) and U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.W. 218 (1967), to be discu' 
later, are in agreement. 
The most often cited reason why no constitutional rigl 
to counsel exists is that implied consent proceedings are civi 
and administrative in nature and not criminal in nature havino 
no criminal penalties and involve safety of the public. As 
this Court knows, the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution providing that, "In all criminal prosecutions, tr 
accused shall enjoy the right • . . to have the assistance of 
counsel for his defense," is applied by the courts only 
to criminal prosecutions. They also have denied its applicabl 
to civil implied consent proceedings. 
The judges in Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 171 
S.E. 2d 199 (1969}, held, along with others that, Virgina's 
implied consent proceedings to be civil and administrative in 
nature. They said: 
An accused who refuses a blood test is not 
required to post bond for his appearance, and he , . 
does not have to give bail or enter into a reco~n1zani 
He is under no legal duty to appear at the hearing 
if he does not desire to introduce evidence of the 
-8-
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basis and reasonableness of his refusal to take a 
test, or for his failure to appear at a hearing. 
In fact, there is nothing about the entire proceeding 
that parallels the Procedure in criminal prosecution. 
(Emphasis added.) 
For other cases on point holding implied consent 
proceedings to be civil in nature and not criminal, see Agnew, 
Calvert, Campbell, Mills, State of Hawaii, Stratikos, Swenumson, 
all supra, and Ziemba v. Johns, 163 N.W. 2d 780 (Neb. 1969). 
These cases specifically hold that the right to counsel, does not 
attach to implied consent proceedings. 
Subsection (h) of Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10 (1953), 
as amended, provides " . evidence of refusal shall be 
admissible in any civil or criminal action •.• " Appellant 
argues that since "refusal evidence" is admissible in a criminal 
prosecution, that the right to counsel should attach when the 
driver is asked to take a chemical test. Other jurisdictions 
(and two U.S. Supreme Court cases) have given some decisive 
reasons why this verbage of the statute is not decisive. 
It should be noted at this point that the constitutional 
question of right to counsel in a criminal case, where evidence 
of refusal or the results of a chemical test are at issue, is not 
before this Court. The only fact tried below was a refusal 
involving a driving privilege. Appellant should, therefore, have 
no standing to raise this question since this case is a civil 
trial de novo and administrative only. 
-9-
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However, if the Court does wish to consider this 
question, there is substantial authority on the constitutiona. 
right to counsel before taking a chemical test under the 
implied consent law even where the proceeding before the Cour: 
is a criminal prosecution. 
In Schmerber, supra, the United States Supreme court 
upheld a California drivers criminal conviction for driving 
while intoxicated. A blood alcohol test was taken over the 
motorist's "counsel-based" objection. The court held that 
the convicted motorist was not entitled to assert the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel for the reasons that he had no rigi 
to refuse the test and "no issue of counsel's ability toassi; 
petitioner in respect of any rights he did possess is present; 
The court said that the test involved no testimonial or com-
municative evidence so the driver was not entitled to assert 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incimination. 
The court also held that due process was complied wit: 
and that the taking of the test did not con~ti tute an unconst: 
tutional search and seizure. 
In People v. Sudduth, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 421 P. 2d 4~: 
(1966), they affirmed a driving under the influence criminal 
conviction. The California Supreme Court, in bank, held that 
Suspects have no constitutional right to 
refuse a test designed to produce physical evid~~­
in the form of a breath sample (cites omitted) wheth< 
or not counsel is present (cite omitted.) 
We note that the physical and psychologi~a~ 
disturbance of the indivdual involved in obtaining 
-10-
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a breath sample is apt to be significantly less than 
that involved in extracting a blood sample, an 
evidence gathering technique recently approved in 
Schmerber v. State of California (1966) 384 U.S. 757, 
86 S. Ct. 1826, 16 L. Ed. 2d 208, and that the blood 
alcohol test and the breath test for alcoholic 
absorption are alternate means for determining the 
percentage of alcohol in the blood. The value of 
such objective scientific data of intoxication 
to supplement the fallible symptomatic of intoxication 
cannot be disputed. (People v. Duroncelay (1957) 48 
Cal. 2d 766, 772, 312 P. 2d 690.) In a day when 
excessive loss of life and and property is caused 
by inebriated drivers, an imperative need exists for 
a fair, efficient, and accurate system of detection, 
enforcement and, hence prevention. (Cite omitted, 
Emphasis added.) 
California and U. s. law is well settled that a driver 
confronted with a chemical test has no constitutional right 
to consult with counsel or to have counsel present whether the 
proceeding in question is civil under California's implied 
consent law, or even a criminal prosecution. The reasons are 
that the motorist has no legal right to refuse the test or to 
assert other privileges such as the Fifth Amendment. Schrnerber, 
Sudduth, Westmoreland, all supra and Ent v. State, Ct. App., 
71 Cal. Rptr. 726 (1968). 
The Arizona Supreme Court in Campbell, supra, denied 
any constitutional right to counsel under its implied consent 
law after holding that a chemical test confrontation under the 
implied consent law was not a "critical stage" requiring 
assistanct of counsel. The court considered the principles 
expoused in Schmerber and Wade, (both supra), to be controlling 
saying: 
-11-
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The United States Supreme Court in United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 
18 L. Ed. 2d 1149 (1967) held that an accused 
ha~ ~ right to the assistance of counsel at any 
critical state of the prosecution. In Wade the 
Court found that a post-indictment lineup was 
such a critical stage. The following passage 
from Wade, however makes it evident that under 
the rationale of that decision respondent was 
not entitled to counsel prior to deciding whether 
or not to submit to the breathalyzer test: 
"The Government characterizes the 
lineup as a mere preparatory step in the 
gathering of the prosecution's evidence 
not different--for Sixth Amendment purposes--
from various other preparatory steps, such 
as systemztized or scientific analyzing of 
the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, 
clothing, hair, and the like. We think 
there are differences which preclude 
such stages being charac.terized as critical 
stages at which the accused has the right 
to the presence of his counsel. Knowledge 
of the techniques of science and technology 
is sufficiently available, and the variables 
in techniques few enough, that the accused 
has the opportunity for a meaningful con-
frontation of the Government's case at trial 
through the ordinary process of cross-
examina tion of the Government's expert 
witnesses and the presentation of the 
evidence of his own experts. The denial 
of a right to have his counsel present at 
such analyses does not therefore violate the 
Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages 
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's 
absence at such states might derogate from 
his right to a fair trial." 388 U. S. at 
pages 227 228, 87 s. ct.at pages 1932-1933. 
As previously noted, under Arizona's Implied Consent 
Law a person does not have a right to refuse to 
submit to a chemical test only the physical power; 
therefore, as in Schmerber, there is no issue of 
counsel's ability to assist respondent in respeE!_ 
of any rights he did possess. It is the opinion 
of this court that respondent was not entitled to 
the assistance of counsel in deciding whether or 
not to submit to the breathalyzer test. 
(Cites omitted, Emphasis added.) 
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see also State v. Kenderski and State v. Trotter. both supra, 
where criminal convictions were affirmed after the courts held 
there was no constitutional right to counsel with respect to 
chemical tests requested. 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in State v. Petkus, 
supra, in affirming a driving under the influence conviction, 
held that the taking of a blood test under its implied consent 
law was not a critical stage of the prosecution. The driver 
was not allowed upon request to talk with his attorney prior to 
his taking the test. They moved to have the test results 
suppressed. The court stated: 
We hold that the decisions to be made by 
an accused under our implied consent law are not 
essentially "a lawyer's decision, (cite omitted), 
but, on the contrary, can be made by a defendant 
in the absence of the assistance of counsel without 
any substantial prejudice to his rights under the 
Sixth Amendment. (Cites omitted.) 
In other words we hold that the taking of 
defendant's blood under the implied consent law 
(cite omitted), was not a "critical" stage of the 
crminal proceeding requiring the assistance of 
counsel "to preserve the defendant's basic right 
to a fair trial." Coleman v. Alabama, supra. The 
Trail Court properly ruled that the results of the 
test of defendant's blood were admissible in evidence 
at the trial. 
The courts stress that under the implied consent law a 
motorist has no right to refuse a test but only the physical 
power. See, for example, Campbell, Kenderski, Schmerber and 
Sudduth, all supra, and State v. Miller, 185 S.E. 2d 239 
(s.c. 1971). The Utah implied consent law by its clear 
language does not give a motorist the "right" to refuse. 
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All vehicle operators are deemed as a matter of law 
to have previously consented to a chemical test. (Hence the 
name of the statute) . Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44 .10 (a) 
provides in part, "Any person operating a motor vehicle in th'. 
state shall be deemed to have given his consent to a chemical 
test or test of his breath, blood, or urine . Utah 
drivers also sign a contract agreeing to the test when applyir 
for their permit to drive. (See the attachedexhibit "A".) Ther 
fore, Utah drivers as in other states, have no "right" to refc 
but certainly the physical power. The cases explain that the 
reason a motorist's physical "refusal" or recision of prior 
consent is allowed. It avoids violence and physical coercion. 
(Very good public policy consering the circumstances surroundi· 
these types of cases generally.) 
Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44 .10 (b), (1953) as arnendec 
provides: 
If such person has been placed under arrest and 
has thereafter been requested by a peace officer to 
submit to any one or more of the chemical tests 
provided for in subsection (a) of this section and 
refuses to submit to such chemical test or tests, 
such person shall be warned by a peace officer 
requesting the test or tests that a :efusal to.sub-
mit to the test or tests can result in revocation of 
his license to operate a motor vehicle. 
Language similar to this has been construed by many courts 
not to give motorists the "right" to refuse. Campbell, supra, 
at 692 states: 
In Arizona (cite omitted), provides that 
"[I]f a person ~nder arrest refuses to submit to 
a chemical test designated by the law enfor~ement Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Insti ute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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agency as provided in subsection A, none shall be 
given." This language does not give a person a 
"right" to refuse to submit to the test only the 
physical power. We agree with the court in (cite 
omitted) that the "obvious reason for acquiescence 
in the refusal of such a test by a person who as 
a matter of law is 'deemed to have given his consent' 
is to avoid the violence which would often attend 
forcible tests upon recalcitrant inebriates." 
(Cite omitted.) 
It is the opinion of this court that since a 
person does not have a right to refuse to submit 
to the test and because the refusal itself is 
not "testimonial communication" that comment upon 
such refusal is not improper. (Emphasis added.) 
The court in Campbell, in footnote 6 at 692, went even 
further in advancing public safety and explained that a wrongful 
refusal to submit was the same type of evidence as the test 
results (non-testimonial) and just as the test results are not 
subject to the Fifth Amendment, neither is evidence of refusal. 
The California Supreme Court in Sudduth, supra, held that 
comment on refusal in a criminal case was constitutionally 
permissible and that the Fifth Amendment did not apply. Then 
the Court explained any different results in other jurisdictions 
with respect to the admissibility of refusal evidence in a 
criminal case can be ascribed to: 
. an underlying constitutional or statutory 
right to refuse to produce the physical evidence 
sought. States that recognize a right to refuse to 
take such tests exclude evidence of a refusal. States 
that recognize no right to refuse allow testimony and 
comment on the refusal. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah now obviously falls in the latter category. Our 
Implied Consent Statute does not give motorists the "right" to 
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refuse and expressly allows refusal evidence in criminal 
proceedings. Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44 .10 (h) (1953) 
as amended. 
Appellant cites three prior Utah cases to support his 
argument that he had a "right" to refuse. Hunter v. Darius, 
23 U. 2d 122, 458 P. 2d 877 (1969), Moran v. Shaw, 580 P. 2d 
241 {Ut. 1978) and Peterson v. Darius, 547 P. 2d 693 (Ut. 197! 
These cases simply addressed the questions of whether or not 
the refusal was reasonable and whether or not there was a 
refusal at all. This Court has never recognized a "right"~ 
refuse. In State v. Miokovich, 185 S_.E. 2d 360 {S.C. 1971) tt 
South Carolina Supreme Court held that comment on refusal ina 
criminal trial was constitutionally permissible and furthfil 
construed that the State's implied consent law (similar to 
Utah's) to clearly not give a motorist the "right" to refuse. 
An example of a jurisdiction in the former category, 
where the statutory right to refuse exists and, therefore, 
the refusal is not admissible into evidence is, State v. 
Stevens, 252 A. 2d 58 (Me. 1969). The court noted that 
Maine's law expressly gives the motorist the right to refuse. 
It provides that a test can only be given upon the consent of 
the motorist. Consent is not implied by that statute. The 
officer simply asks the motorist if he would like a chemical 
test and explains the legal ramifications. Our Legislature as 
in other jurisdictions, as indicated above, clearly intended 
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just th~ opposite policy. The authorities cited in Appellant's 
brief are distinguishable. 
Appellant cites Siegwald, supra, and State v. Welch, 
376 A. 2d 834 (Vt. 1977) claiming that the right to counsel was 
extended in those cases for the reason that refusal evidence 
was admissible in criminal proceedings. The Siegwald, statute 
extended a statutory right to counsel while Welch extended a 
limited right to counsel only after concluding that the 
motorist had a "right" to refuse. Welch also involved a 
serious criminal automobilB homocide case. People v. Gursey, 
N.Y. Ct. of App., 239 N.E. 2d 351 (19?8) extended a limited right 
to counsel but was also a criminal case recognizing the 
motorist's right to refuse. 
Appellant cites Deaner v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 285, 
170 S.E. 2d 199 (1969), State v. Dellveneri, supra and Stratikos, 
supra, claiming that the denial of counsel in those cases is 
based partly on the fact that refusal evidence is not admissible 
in criminal proceedings. The holdings are not that broad. 
Those courts did not discuss "refusal evidenc~" or the 
ramifications on the right to counsel issue, if such evidence 
was allowed. The courts simply declared the proceedings to be 
civil and held that no constitutional right to counsel attached 
for that reason. The court in Stratikos stated it did not even 
see the need for a "critical stage" inquiry since the proceeding 
was not criminal in nature. 
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Appellant states in his brief at P. 4 that ~ 
388 U.S. 218 (1967), a robbery case, stands for the propositio 
that: 
. an accused does not have to stand alone 
against state prosecution at any stage of criminal 
prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out of 
court, if the absence of counsel might infringe 
upon his right to a fair trial. 
Appellant cannot ignore the court's discussion and reasoning c 
scientific evidence and physical gathering techniques cited 
above. 
The Government characterizes the lineup as a 
mere preparatory step in the gathering of the 
prosecution's evidence, not different--for Sixth 
Amendment purposes--from various other preparatory 
steps, such as systematized or scientific analyzing 
of the accused fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, 
hair, and the like. We think there are differences 
which preclude such stages being characterized as 
critical stages at which the accused has the right 
to the presence of his counsel. Knowledge of the 
techniques of science and technology is sufficiently 
available, and the variables in techniques few 
enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a 
meaningful confrontation of the Government's case 
at trial through the ordinary processes of cross-
examination of the Government's expert witnesses 
and the presentation of the evidence of his own 
experts. The denial or a right to have his counsel 
present at such analyses does not therefore violate 
the Sixth Amendment; they are not critical stages 
since there is minimal risk that his counsel's 
absence at such stages might derogate from his 
right to a fair trial. 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) simply held 
that the right to counsel was guaranteed at the point where t' 
accused, prior to arraignment, was subjected to secret interr': 
gation despite repeated requests to see his lawyer. (Not our 
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facts here). Escobedo also dealt with crucial criminal evidence 
subject to the Fifth Amendment. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 
682 (1972) is likewise inapplicable to the facts of this civil 
case. 
Article I, Sections 11 and 12 of the Utah Constitution 
relied on by the Appellant provide free access to the courts. 
Section 12 providing that "the accused shall not be compelled 
to give evidence against himself" is duplicative of the 
United States Consitution's Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination and should be interpreted no broader than 
its federal counterpart. Our statute grants free access, trial 
de novo and appeal. 
Respondent has cited cases from 21 jurisdictions holding 
that a drunk driver has no constitutional right to consult with 
counsel or to have counsel present before deciding whether or 
not to take a chemical test under similar implied consent 
laws. These cases all say that miranda rights and criminal 
safeguards do not attach, and our statute imposes no criminal 
penalties. With respect to implied consent proceedings, Respondent 
could find no authority granting a constitutional right to 
counsel although a minority has extended a limited statutory 
right. Our Legislature has expressly stated that such a right 
does not exist and there are no legal or logical reasons to over-
turn that policy. Specifically, Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10 
(g) (1953) as amended. 
In conclusion, if this Honorable Court does decide to 
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consider the question of constitutional rather th an statutory 
right to counsel before a chemical test in the criminal 
context, Respondent has cited substantial authority. rt ster 
from two United States Supreme Court case, Schmerber d an ~· 
both supra, and seems to be persuasive. 
POINT III 
THERE EXPRESSLY IS NO STATUTORY RIGHT TO CONSULT 
WITH COUNSEL OR TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT FOR A 
REQUESTED CHEMICAL TEST UNDER THE UTAH IMPLIED 
CONSENT STATUTE 
The Utah Legislature has expressly declared that "for 
the purpose of determining whether to submit to a chemical te: 
or tests, the person to be tested shall not have the right~ 
consult an attorney nor shall such a person be permitted to h; 
an attorney . . . present as a condition for the taking of an1 
test." Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10 {g) (1953) as amended. 
As discussed under Point I, subsection {g) does not 
violate the Utah or the United States Constitutions. The 
policy reasons why the legislature chose not to grant a 
statutory right to counsel under the implied consent drivers 
licensing statute are obvious and compelling! Even one maimir 
or death on the highways caused by drinking drivers is sorr0>
1 
for family and friends and a drain on society--let alone what 
statistics show statewide. 
• the 
It is common scientific knowledge that alcohol in 
blood spreads evenly and quickly but dissipates with time. 
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Therefore, the public interest demands that a driver suspected 
of driving under the influence of intoxicants be given his 
I 
chance for a chemical test swiftly. Any and all maneuvering 
and stalling on the part of the drinking driver must be avoided. 
The innocent public's rights are obvious, prevailing and should 
tip the scales of justice and decency. The court in State v. 
Pandoli, N.J. Super., 262 A. 2d 41 (1970) very aptly said it: 
In any event, the request for consultation 
with counsel necessarily involved a delay in adminis-
tration of the test. Having in mind the remedial 
purpose of the statute, and the rapidity with which 
the passage of time and the physiologicil processes 
tend to eliminate evidence of ingested alcohol in 
the system, it is sensible to construe the statute 
to mean that anything substantially short of an unquali-
fied, unequivocal assent to an officer's request 
that the arrested motorist take the test consti-
tutes a refual to do so. (Cite omitted.) The 
occasion is not one for debate, maneuver or~­
negotiation, but rather for a simple "yes" or 
"no" to the officer's request. (Emphasis added.) 
Before enactment of the 1977 amendments to the Utah 
implied consent law,many implied consent cases involved 
extensive factual inquiries into innumerable issues surrounding 
the drivers request to consult with counsel. For example; Was 
the request reasonable, made solely for delay, would late phone 
calls unduly hamper the test, how much time should be given, 
and under what circumstances, etc. Well, our Legislature (and 
the Courts cited above) clearly answered all of these issues 
in one decisive swoop. These difficult fact questions, the con-
tinual attempts to delay the test and the grave public interest 
certainly provide substantial justification for the Legislature's 
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express denial of a statutory right to counsel in the mat~r 
the drivers license. 
Some jurisdictions have extended motorists a limited 
right to counsel based upon statute, rule or police proc~mr 
and some of these jurisdictions solely extend this right when 
criminal prosecution is at issue. If there were a conflictir 
Utah statute, regulation or rule extending to an arrested 
driver a blanket right to consult with counsel about a test 
or drivers license, subsection (g), supra, expresses the most 
recent intent of the Utah Legislature and should be supreme. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT APPELLANT REFUSED 
AND TRIED TO DELAY THE BREATHALYZER TEST IS 
SUPPORTED BY FACT AND SHOULD NOT BE REVERSED 
The statute under which this case was tried specificai. 
provides that no right to counsel exists and that the driver 
has no right to condition the test upon the presence of an 
attorney or anyone else. Utah Code Annotated, 41-6-44.10 (gl 
(1953) as amended. 
This Court has never stated that a refusal must ~ 
unconditional under any circumstances, nor have the Courts fro· 
other jurisdictions. It is clear that the unreasonable 
conditioning a chemical test upon the right to counsel or any 
other delay tactic, when no such right exists, constitutes a 
refusal. The court in Spradling, supra, defines refusal as 
follows: 
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There is no mysterious meaning to the word 
"refusal". In the context of the implied consent 
law, it simply means that an arrestee, after having 
been requested to take the breathalyzer test, declines 
to do so of his own volition. Whether the declination 
is accomplished by verbally saying, "I refuse", or 
by remaining silent and just not breathing or 
blowing into the machine, or by vocalizing some 
sort of qualified or conditional consent or 
refusal, does not make any difference. The 
volitional failure to do what is necessary in 
order that the test can be performed is a refusal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Mills, supra, also states: 
It has been quite uniformly held by the courts 
which have considered the issue that a qualified or 
conditional refusal to take a test to determine the 
level of blood alcohol is a refusal within the meaning 
of statutes similar to ours .. A defendant cannot con-
dition his consent of the test upon the presence of 
counsel. (Cites omitted, Emphasis added.) 
See also Coleman, Commonwealth v. Cannon, State v. Pandoli, 
Swenumson, Westmoreland and Wiseman, all supra. Based upon 
Utah law, the trial court properly found that Appellant's 
refual to take the breathalyzer test until he contacted his 
attorney definitely was a refusal upon the law and the facts, and 
shouldn't be overturned. 
Appellant cites some case law to support his contention 
that he was sincerely confused concerning his right to counsel 
and, therefore, his (admitted) refusal was reasonable. 
Appellant did not tell the officer that he was confused about 
his rights or ask for a further explanation. He simply 
refused to take a test without his attorney being present and 
was told he could call his attorney after the test. (R-101, 117). 
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--
The cases seem to say that it is incumbent upon the off' icer 
clear up any confusion concerning "rights" only when confus; 
is objectively manifested, which was not found by this Trial 
Judge. 
Although Appellant (a law student) claims he was 
confused about his right, the Trial Judge who heard and saw 1 
witnesses specifically found that Appellant "had a chip on hi 
shoulder clear up to his eyebrows. He wasn't about to ta~ 
test. He had a little smattering of law and thought he kne' 
everything. There's no question about that in my mind." 
(R-41, 130). The Trial Judge also found that Appellant's 
request for counsel was delayed and interposed for delay of 
the test. (R-40, 131). 
The evidence brought out at trial is sufficient~~ 
the trial judge's findings of fact. It is a well establishe1 
principle that the trial court's findings of fact should not 
be reversed on appeal "unless he clearly does violence ~ 
the facts as they relate to his findings." Gassman, supra. 
The above principle is especially important in this 1 
since much of the testimony at trial was contradictory. 
See for example the Trial Record at 12 3. See also the Trial 
Record at 99 and 127 where the officer testified Appellant g: 
out of his car three times while waiting for the officer. N 
R-126, Appellant testified that he absolutely did not, durini 
this same time, ever get out of his car. 
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POINT V 
THERE IS NO STATUTORY LIMITED RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
IN ORDER TO DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT TAKE A CHEMICAL 
TEST TO DETERMINE THE ALCOHOLIC CONTENT OF ONES 
BLOOD IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
The Appellant argues that it is a critical stage of the 
criminal proceedings. As pointed out previously, the implied 
consent statute only involves a driving privilege, is a solely 
civil and administrative proceeding, and therefore; the burden 
of proof in the criminal trial and its accompanying penalties 
and rights are not applicable. Even if they were, the United 
States Supreme Court in the Wade, supra, specifically pointed 
out that the taking of blood was not a critical stage in the 
proceedings nor was it testimonial evidence requiring all of 
the criminal protections of the Fifth Amendment and due process. 
This decision was upheld in May, 1977 in the Dixon v. Love, 
supra. The Appellant cites the language of Kirby v. Illinois, 
surpa, which reiterates the supreme court's decision stating 
that there is no substantial prejudice to the individual's 
rights because he has a right to cross-examining, confront the 
test and witnesses in a subsequent trial de novo. Of course, 
that right is granted by the Utah implied consent statute. 
Appellant cites Peterson and Hunter, both supra, Gassman 
v. Dorius, 543 P. 2d 197 (Utah 1975) and Gooch v. Spradling, 
523 S.W. 2d 861 (Mo. 1975) arguing that. any refusal or with-
drawal of prior consent must be unequivocal. These cases all 
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involved a limited right to counsel within reason and dealt 
with the motorist's attempts to contact counsel agreed to 
by the officers. Each case applied reason under the facts~ 
particular circumstances. 
The legislature realized the driver's opportuni~~ 
delay tactics under the former law and shifted the focus 
away from those fact inquiries into the "reasonableness" of 
a refusal to the simpler question of: Was there a refusal? 
This intent was expressed by the 1977 amendment's deletion oi 
"without reasonable cause" from the former law. 
If at said hearing the department determines 
that the person was granted the right to submit 
to a chemical test and without reasonable cause) 
refused to submit to such test, or if such person 
fails to appear before the department as required 
in the notice, the department shall revoke for one 
year his license or permit to drive. (Deleted 
language underlined.) Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10, 
(1953), as amended. 
The 1977 Legislature also deleted the words "without 
reason" from the last sentence of sub-paragraph (a) of t~ 
above quoted statute, substituting the words "a peace officer' 
for arresting officer. Therefore, it was the apparent intent 
of the legislature as shown by specifically deleting the words 
"within reason" and "without reasonable cause" to not only all 
the officer choice of tests, but require the individual total 
that test without any limited right to counsel. 
Such expressions of intent by the legislature have 
· of 
often been upheld by this Court, it has long been a maxim 
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statutor~ construction that where a express provision of a 
statute is deleted (especially a whole paragraph) there is 
a presumption that there was a specific change in the law 
intended. That is what this Court said in the case of Allen v. 
Board of Education of Weber County, 120 Utah 556, 236 P. 2d 
756, 763 (1951), and in other cases: 
. It is clear that when express powers are 
conferred upon such a governing body and by subsequent 
amendment a section of the enactment which conferred 
a specific power is repealed, there is manifest a 
legislative intent to withdraw the specific power 
(Emphasis added.) 
Such is the law of other states such as California 
as accentuated in the case of Subsequent Injuries Fund v. Indust-
rial Acc. Commission, 31 Ca. Rptr. 477, 382 P. 2d 597 (1963). 
The Appellant argues that he should have had a limited 
right to counsel because his refusal was not unequivocal. 
Such is not supported by the facts as found by the trial judge. 
The facts show that it was unequivocal the first time and the 
second time conditioned on an attorney being present. Since 
consent to the test is implied by the statute and also specific-
ally contracted for and agreed to by the individual when he 
applies for his license (See exhibit "A"), we urge this Court 
to hold that there is even less of a burden upon the drivers 
license division to show any kind of refusal at all. If there 
is any right to counsel implied, it would have to be based on 
the reasonableness of the situation and the facts of the case. 
This in essence puts the arresting officer on trial, which is 
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surely not the intent of the statute. If unreasonablcnc:ss 0, 
reasonableness becomes an element, it should surely be in 
the nature of an affirmative defense that should be plead a~ 
proved by the driver who has previously consented to the 
taking of the chemical test. 
CONCLUSION 
The only conclusion that this Court can draw is that 
the Trial Court was right in its decision that the amended 
statute gives no statutory right to counsel, and that there w; 
a specific, unconditional refusal. Also that, there was no 
constitutional right to counsel, and even if there were, the 
request was made solely for purposes of delay, as found by the 
Trial Judge. 
DATED this day of November, 1978. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
~ral ~ 
®CmALE~ 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant and 
Respondent 
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TION t. . THIS APPUCATIO!"I. 
ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS BELOW 
I. DO \"OU WKAR CONTACT'! OR 1;a.ASS&S? 
2. AAi YOU t-IOW OR HAVE \'OU BEHN tJCENS'ED TO DRIVE D"I' A.'iY 
STATE? 
IF YES, UST BBLQW EACH SUCH 51'AT2, T"B UCE.."ISE NUMBER AND 
£XPIRATIOH DATBr 
'= 
QRIV 11q:ss'i'i NO 
I, HA3 'iOUR DIVVD«J PIUV1LEGS EVER BEllN RBYOKSD, SUSH!'i!DED, 
CANCELED OR DDIZD? 
IFYES. l:"DiCAT!. ______________ _ 
(DU.) 
AFFIDAVIT 
ITAT! OP UTAH 
~U'ltTYOP_~-------
A;p~HE UND~RSICNl.O, BEQofO DULY SWOIUI, STATE THAT I A>1 THS 
THAT iAHT DESC!UBlD ABOVE: THAT I AM AT LE.\.ST 18 YEARS OF AGE• 
TIOlf TH~~~~ C.\RBPULLY READ SAID APPLlCATION A."D THE L'ff0R~~ 
lbr MY IQ.owu;:."'5MKD BY Al! IS TRUE AND CORRECT TO TH!!: BEST 
X-~~~~~~~-
t SJ GNAT UR B or APPLICANT - L" CIKJ 
IUMcRnu·:o ANO SWOM TO BEFORH )IS THIS_ DAY OF ___ .. _ 
.,LO s !P-l:i.!) 
T/71 
(:'iOT AltY Pl!BUCJ 
YES NO 
DD 
CJ Cl 
CJ CJ 
4. DlilWiG THB LAST .fo YEARS HAW YOU BB!~ HOSPITALEZllD FOR Mt 
[}K>Tto!'IALOR ~l.S!'ITAL co:r.vrrtON? CJ Cl 
S. DO YOU HAYE AHIST'ORYOFEPfLEPSY',SErzURES.MBMTALClO~ 
CO!'IYt."LSJOfrlS.. •sU.CKOUTS·. 01zzy snu.s. ETC.t c::J D 
I. HAVE YOU HAD HEAllT TROUBl..L DIABBT~ PAR.ALY3 ... 011 All1' 
OTHC:R PHYSICAL HA. . DlCAP OR DISABIUT1' lQTHWR TRAM Vl9IDll 
DEFECTS)? c::J c::J 
JF YES., INDICATE 
7. ff.WE YOU BESM COMVICTEO Ol' DR.IYIMG WHJLS Dfl'OXICATSD OR 
1.IN'DEa THB L"llFLUDiic&·or DRUCS? D CJ 
8. OCCUPATIO:it•-----------------
A5SU)IPTIOM or UABIUTY FOR MINOllS 
UNDER EIGHTE'!N YEARS or AGB 
STATE OP UTAH ) SS.. 
COl>i'iTYOP _____ I 
J, THE UNDER51~EO. BEING DULY S"M>RN. STATE THAT I AMTllS 
________ OF THE APPLICA."f'? NAMED H!RElJI; THAT I 
HAVE READ THB STATElolt!;!llTS HE HAS MAD! IN THIS APPLICATIO!ll MID 
THAT THEY ARE TRUE A..~D CORR£CT TO THE BEST07 MY IOIOWl.£008. 
I HEREBY CO!\ISENT"TO ASSUME THE OBLIGATION" 1"41POS&D UNDBil s&C. 
41-2-10, UTAH cone: ,.. ... SOTA.TED 1953 AS .ulBND!l>. or D~OIOIMTLY 
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE APPLICA."'fT FOR A. . Y DA>ilo\CD 
CAUSED BY HJ~ NEGLIGKSCE OK WILLFUL SUSCONOUCT WHIJ .. K H& IS· 
U?'DER THE ACiE OF EJGHTEE:t YEARS WHE:t DRIVDIG A NO'l'OR YBIUCL& 
UPO~ A HIGHWAY. x (Sl~ATURE or PAREJrfT OR arHllR 
RESPO:t~U1t.E PERSON - Cl INK) 
SUBSCRIBED A."'DSWOR:tTOBBFORB ME THIS-DAY or ___ ,,.__ 
~AHY PUBLIC) 
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